OGAWA, Akira

   Associate Professor

   Division of Arts and Sciences, College of Liberal Arts, International Christian University
Language English
Publication Date 2010/06
Type Research Paper (Scientific Journal)
Title On the Robustness of Private Leadership in Mixed Duopoly
Contribution Type Joint Work
Journal Australian Economic Papers
Volume, Issue, Pages 49(2),pp.149-160
Author and coauthor OGAWA, Akira, Toshihiro Matsumura
Details We investigate a mixed duopoly where a state-owned public enterprise competes against a profit-maximising private enterprise. We analyse whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the observable delay game. We find that private leadership is always risk dominant. We also investigate how ownership structure in a public firm affects the equilibrium distribution of roles. We find that the roles are as follows: (1) Cournot, when the degree of privatisation is low, (2) private leadership, when it is middle, (3) both private leadership and public leadership, when it is high. The result implies that private leadership is again more robust.
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8454.2010.00393.x