オガワ，アキラ   OGAWA, Akira   小川　昭    所属   国際基督教大学教養学部 アーツ・サイエンス学科    職種   准教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2009/07
形態種別	研究論文（学術雑誌）
標題	Payoff Dominance and Risk Dominance in the Observable Delay Game: A Note
執筆形態	共著
掲載誌名	Journal of Economics
巻・号・頁	97(3),pp.265-272
著者・共著者	OGAWA, Akira, Toshihiro Matsumura
概要	We examine whether the payoff dominant sequential-move (Stackelberg) outcome is realized when timing is endogenized. We adopt the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky [Games Econ Behav 2(1):29–46, 1990]. We find that if one sequential-move outcome is payoff dominant, either (i) the outcome both players prefer is the unique equilibrium; or (ii) two sequential-move outcomes are equilibria and the one both players prefer is risk dominant. In other words, no conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game exists, in contrast to other games such as (non pure) coordination games. We also find that even if one of two sequential-move outcomes is the unique equilibrium outcome in the observable delay game, it does not imply that the equilibrium outcome is payoff dominant to the other sequential-move outcome.
DOI	10.1007/s00712-009-0065-z